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Abstract 
NASA’s Constellation Program has made the most progress in a generation toward building an 
integrated human-rated spacecraft and launch vehicle.  During that development, it became clear 
that NASA’s human-rating requirements lacked the specificity necessary to defend a program plan, 
particularly human-rating test flight plans, from severe budget challenges.  This paper addresses 
the progress Constellation achieved, and problems encountered, in clarifying and defending a 
human-rating certification plan, and discusses key considerations for those who find themselves in 
similar straits with future human-rated spacecraft and vehicles.  We assert, and support with space 
flight data, that NASA’s current human-rating requirements do not adequately address “unknown-
unknowns,” or the unexpected things the hardware can reveal to the designer during test.  
Introduction 
Deciding that a system is ready for first crewed flight requires evidence that the design avoids or 
controls human space flight safety and survival risks well enough to warrant flying a crew on that 
mission.  In the face of repeated budget cuts,i the Constellation Program found it necessary on at 
least an annual basis to reduce the scope of its test and evaluation (T&E) plan and thus reduce the 
body of evidence expected to be produced in support of the decision to fly crew aboard the vehicle.   
As a result, the expected increase in understanding the risk was hampered by ever shrinking test 
data availability.  There was persistent debate among knowledgeable and experienced experts 
within and without the Program as to how to achieve sufficient readiness for the first crewed flight.  
In response to the Program’s request, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) prepared 
and released a Technical Assessment Report of its study on “Readiness for First Crewed Flight”ii.   
The purpose of this paper is to supplement the NESC report findings with detail of the Constellation 
experience and to provide additional observations and recommendations.  We begin by amplifying 
the NESC Report’s Appendix on testing with a brief Constellation view of why we test, followed by 
discussion of the background and rationale for the Constellation flight test plan, and describe the 
incremental erosion of that flight test plan through a series of annual budget reductions.  We 
discuss the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) timeframe study of a proposal aimed at recouping the 
ground lost via earlier reductions.  We then address the shortfalls in NASA’s current human-rating 
criterion from the perspectives of the Constellation experience.  We conclude by recommending 
actions for future human space flight programs in this regard.   
All of the concerns voiced and decisions reported in this paper were documented “in the open” in 
the appropriate Constellation Program management and control forums; however, we have chosen 
not to cite the many applicable meeting minutes or decision packages, since they are not readily 
available in the open literature.  This paper serves as the summary of relevant discussions and 
decisions at that time, and, by citation, is part of the lessons learned from the Constellation 
Programi. 
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Why We Test: Perspectives on Testing Effectiveness 
A number of measures and approaches can be used to establish and execute effective testing with 
the objective of addressing all risks, both known and unknown. This section addresses these 
approaches, and discusses areas where we believe the approaches have fallen short. 
Verification and validation 
Appendix A of the NESC reportii does a good job of describing the role of testing with respect to 
verification and validation.  This view was shared among many within the Program.   
We assert, however, that the Agency, and indeed the aerospace community as a whole, has become 
too fixated on verification of compliance to a specification.  Verification objectives alone should not 
comprise a complete T&E plan, and do not sufficiently interrogate the system, allowing it to “speak” 
of issues not addressed in a specification.  Verification has become a checklist merely confirming 
compliance with specified items.  Granted, the good specifications are based on a mature heritage of 
testing failures and lessons learned, but cannot take the place of thoughtful design, risk 
identification, and a thorough T&E plan.   
Validation activities are also part of the necessary work set forth in a T&E plan to create or sustain 
an “as-certified” baseline, even for a “one-off” system.  Validation includes defining the capabilities 
and constraints of the specific design, characterizing the system’s behavior, confirming the control 
of hazards, confirming the accuracy and validity of predictive models, confirming operational plans 
and procedures, and proving that the system is suitable for its intended purposes.  For context, 
human-rating certification examines the subset of the as-certified baseline (verification and 
validation data) related to crew safety and survival. 
Test like you fly 
What is understated in the NESC report, and ignored by many, is that there is another, possibly 
more important, role for testing—to provide opportunities to learn from flight-configured 
hardware and software in operational scenarios with appropriately relevant environments (test 
like you fly).  This approach is critical in finding unknown-unknowns and even “unknown-knowns.”1  
In an era where projects are often continuously challenged to do more with less, it is easy to 
rationalize moving individual preliminary test objectives from one distant test to another without 
recognizing a loss of test effectiveness (ability to find design flaws or latent defects) in an attempt to 
project a lower-cost test campaign.  This “bucketing” activity—delaying testing until a higher level 
of assembly is reached where more objectives can be met with fewer tests—presupposes a more 
comprehensive understanding of the inherent risks than actually is possible during the early life of 
the program.  This delaying approach, while attractive in reducing early costs, risks higher costs 
                                                          
1 An example of an unknown-known was the rediscovery of tribo-electrification during the Ares I-X 
countdown. This is characterized as an unknown-known since the Space Shuttle was plagued by this 
phenomena several years prior. 
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and schedule impacts to correct problems when they are later found.  More importantly, this way of 
thinking only deals with the “known-knowns” and “known-unknowns.”  “Test like you fly” is a 
proven approach that should not be underestimated or discounted. 
The “incompressible” test list 
One recommended technique to sustain a test plan is to document an incompressible test list at the 
early stages of the program2.  This can be difficult to develop for a complex multi-element program, 
but provides a means to establish and protect a program’s ability to deliver the test results needed 
to make the human-rating decisions.  Constellation set out to identify the testing necessary to 
certify safety and survival-related functions (considered “incompressible”) as part of the integrated 
T&E plan delivered at PDR.  This plan was based on requirements, design feature assessments, and 
hazard analyses to identify the critical content.  Constellation established a plan to accomplish T&E 
plan development in lockstep with requirement, architecture, and design maturation; however, it 
was incomplete at PDR, as the program intended to further mature T&E planning at later 
milestones, concentrating instead on requirement and design issue resolution at PDR.   
Program managers must strive to consider or forecast what the minimum data set may be for 
making the first crewed flight decision with limited information at the beginning of a program, and 
then work to protect it.  The program’s frequent need to react to a changing budget outlook rippled 
through its T&E planning efforts and was also a factor in its inability to solidify its strategy.   
In retrospect, some of the initially conceived T&E objectives being used for planning (those that 
accompanied the development and trades of the architecture and design concepts), could have been 
identified as “human-rating critical” when the early work could show a connection between those 
T&E objectives and the eventual need for the first-crewed-flight decision makers to know that the 
safety and survival critical functions, features, and controls would be available as intended to 
protect that crew.  As a lesson learned, we offer that an approach like this would enable managers 
to more easily protect key objectives earlier as the program and its T&E plan mature and react to 
changes of any kind or from any cause. 
The Criterion for Human-Rating 
NASA’s general guidance from NPR 8705.2B, Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems iii is as 
follows:  
A human-rated system accommodates human needs, effectively utilizes human capabilities, controls 
hazards with sufficient certainty to be considered safe for human operations, and provides, to the 
maximum extent practical, the capability to safely recover the crew from hazardous situations.  Human-
rating consists of three fundamental tenets:  
                                                          
2 This is conceived as a minimum threshold listing of absolute needs to certify the program, developed early 
in the program. Its weakness can be that it is not necessarily a requirements-driven list, but is based on 
judgment, and is therefore little more effective in the face of budget threats.  
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 (1) Human-rating is the process of designing, evaluating, and assuring that the total system can safely 
conduct the required human missions.  
 (2) Human-rating includes the incorporation of design features and capabilities that accommodate 
human interaction with the system to enhance overall safety and mission success.  
 (3) Human-rating includes the incorporation of design features and capabilities to enable safe recovery 
of the crew from hazardous situations.  Human-rating is an integral part of all program activities 
throughout the life cycle of the system, including design and development; test and verification; program 
management and control; flight readiness certification; mission operations; sustaining engineering; 
maintenance/upgrades; and disposal. 
NASA’s human-rating criterionii as stated by the NESC is “Given that the human spaceflight system 
is designed for human spaceflight, it is accepted that the objective is to fly humans when risks to the 
crew safety have been mitigated to the point where the need or benefit is worth the residual risks.” 
NASA has the experience of human-rating prior launch vehicles: the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo 
programs in the 1960s and the Space Shuttle Program in the early 1980s, all of which occurred 
before the career arc of the vast majority of the current NASA workforce.3 
This criterion, while sensible and easy to understand in principle, is difficult to implement as 
certification guidance for the first human test flight because it can be broadly interpreted.  It is left 
to program management to interpret into a design, development, analysis, and test plan that leads 
to certification for human space flight. Such broad interpretation can result in some otherwise 
necessary work being defined as not critical, and therefore more vulnerable to being cut in the face 
of budget challenges. Moreover, this approach does not necessarily address whether a minimum 
level of T&E is necessary to reveal unknown-unknown risks, since these are, by definition, not part 
of residual risk.  
The instrument for assessing whether the program can achieve human-rating is the T&E plan.  A 
sufficient plan queries the hardware and software for the known-unknown risks (part of the 
residual risk in the human-rating criterion parlance), and also affords opportunities for it to reveal 
problems that requirement verification, design validation, and risk mitigation did not. 
Meeting the human-rating rationale 
The very nature of the current human-rating criterion implies that the real decision to first fly crew 
is not made until the parameters of value and benefit can be evaluated and understood. Logically, 
the information required for this would not be available until later in a program’s life cycle, 
approaching the time at which the decision must be made—that is, the point at which prerequisite 
testing and evaluation is complete or nearing completion, when hazards and other risks are 
identified and controlled to the extent practical, and when the value can be judged by the nation’s 
                                                          
3
 This does not discount the valuable experience of sustaining the Space Shuttle’s human rating, or the two 
major re-assessments of the human certification following the Challenger and Columbia accidents.  
Additionally, the ISS program provided recent workforce with experience in human rating spacecraft, but not 
launch vehicles. Historically, the greater risk to life lies with the launch vehicles. 
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needs at that time.  The reasons for needing a crew on a given flight may change over the Design, 
Development, Test & Evaluation timeframe depending on the program’s objectives and national 
priorities.  
It is therefore necessary to assure that the information required by decision makers to assess the 
risk is available to them when that time comes.  The processes that a program puts in place—be 
they design, verification, risk analysis, etc.—are equally as important as the T&E strategy it 
executes.  Deficiencies in either will hamper the decision makers’ ability to make the right call at 
that time.  An insufficient plan makes an insufficient data set. 
In reality, however, the decision maker will rarely have all the information he or she would like to 
have to make that call.  As with Constellation, most programs will face tightening constraints in 
budgets and timelines that will reduce or eliminate the program’s ability to provide comprehensive 
data for the decision.   
Since safety is not a binary function with a yes or no evaluation, we postulate an interpretation of 
the certification criterion used by NESC: it is safe enough to fly humans when the benefit of flying 
the crew is greater than the residual risk.  This implies that understanding both the benefit of flying 
the crew and the residual risk is necessary to make the decision.   
Understanding the benefit of flying the crew  
The Constellation Program followed the Space Shuttle Program in human-rating a new space 
transportation system.  Lack of understanding of the initial launch decision for the Space Shuttle 
caused great debate almost 30 years later.  Most had forgotten, or never knew, that the precedent of 
flying the crew on the first flight had been driven by the value of flying the crew to compensate for 
uncertainties in the entry handling characteristics (known-unknown) that could manifest 
themselves during reentry communications outages (known-known)iv.  
Unlike the clear need for a crew to mitigate known risks to save an extremely valuable reusable 
asset, which existed on the Space Shuttle’s first flight, the Constellation Program was in the midst of 
defining crew interfaces and procedures.  The Program had yet to define scenarios where crew 
intervention was critical to improve mission success.  The one value of flying the crew established 
to date was to meet the earliest declaration of initial operational capability (IOC) possible, enabling 
American flights to the International Space Station (ISS) after Space Shuttle retirement. 
Understanding the risk 
Constellation used the concept of Risk Informed Design, along with more traditional approachesi, to 
gain a better understanding of the risks in the design.  In addition to expected preliminary design 
products, the projects had made significant progress in identifying hazards and control strategies, 
probabilistic risk assessments and reliability assessments, including failure modes and effects 
analyses.  These products were to mature as detailed designs matured and test data validated 
assumptions and models.  Initial drafts of the integrated test plans, though preliminary and driven 
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primarily for the purpose of scoping cost, appeared to be modest, yet sufficient to human rate the 
Initial Capability (IC) systems.  
The known residual risk is well discussed in the NESC reportii.  While the NESC authors touch on it, 
one of the greatest challenges for Constellation was to get the larger team, beyond those daily 
involved in risk analysis, to better understand the need to seek opportunities to find the unknown 
risks. 
Constellation Overview 
NASA formed the Constellation Program in 2005 to achieve the objectives of maintaining American 
presence in low Earth orbit, returning to the moon for purposes of establishing an outpost, and 
laying the foundation to explore Mars and beyond in the first half of the 21st century.  The 
Constellation Program’s heritage rested on the successes and lessons learned from NASA’s previous 
human space flight programs:  Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Space Shuttle, and the ISSv.  
Following the loss of Columbia, NASA established the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) 
to perform an in-depth review of the Space Shuttle Program.  As a result of this review, the CAIB 
concluded that it was in the best interest of the U.S. to develop a replacement for the Space Shuttle.  
The CAIB concluded that it should be possible using past and future investments in technology to 
develop the basis for a system, “significantly improved over one designed 40 years earlier, for 
carrying humans to orbit and enabling their work in space.”vi 
The Program was charged with achieving an order-of-magnitude improvement in risk to crew and 
mission over that of the Space Shuttle. Probabilistic risk assessment at that time put the risk of loss 
of crew for the Space Shuttle on the order 10-2.  Constellation was challenged by the Agency to 
improve this to the order of 10-3. 
Since exploration of the moon and beyond was the overarching goal of the Constellation Program, 
all elements were initially designed to perform the lunar missions, while also being capable of 
performing missions to the ISS. The Program was planned as a stepwise capability build-up largely 
based on Space Shuttle heritage components.  The IC comprised elements necessary to service the 
ISS by 2015 with crew rotations, including the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, the Ares I Crew 
Launch Vehicle, and the supporting ground and mission infrastructure to enable these missions.  
The Constellation Lunar Capability (LC) added the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle, the Altair Lunar 
Lander, and spacesuits designed for partial gravity exploration.  Lunar outpost elements and 
capabilities were to follow, including mobility elements such as rovers, permanent or semi-
permanent habitats, and power and communication elements to support a sustained exploration 
presence.  
The remainder of this paper focuses on the erosion of test flight planning for the IC, since it had the 
more immediate need, although similar debate was taking place in the initial planning for the LC 
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components and configuration.4 The following discussions illustrate the challenges encountered by 
the Constellation Program in implementing the human-rating criterion to certify the IC 
configuration for human flight, and how further clarity could enhance future human-rating 
certifications. 
Flight Test Plan—Beginnings and Rationale 
The Constellation Program was developing NASA’s first new human-rated spacecraft in three 
decades, and a comprehensive series of flight test activities was planned in order to find and fix any 
design problems, and to certify and document vehicle performance capabilities (including flight 
crew safety and survival designs) before human flights began.   
Flight test operations are unpredictable by nature, and this is especially true when new designs and 
new hardware are being tested for the first time in extreme operational environments (see Table 1, 
Figure 2, and related discussion).  Indeed, recent historical launch vehicle test flight experience 
indicates that overall confidence in the engineering design will be established after the 7th launchvii. 
While the Program worked to design the safest human space system ever developed, its test plan 
was success oriented given the constraints of the budget and schedulev. 
Flight test plan 
The initial flight test planviii is described below and illustrated in Figure 1.  Two of these flight tests 
successfully launched prior to Program cancellation (as noted by check marks in Figure 1). 
 The pad abort (PA) flight tests were designed to test the Launch Abort System (LAS) and 
parachute system in a pad-abort scenario (no launch vehicle ignition).  PA-1 was an early 
pathfinder intended to provide design insight in the PDR timeframe using a mock-up of the 
crew module.  It successfully launched from the White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in April 
2010. While similar, PA-2 was planned with higher fidelity (flight-like) hardware. 
 The ascent abort tests (AA series) were to use surplus Air Force Peacekeeper first stage and/or 
second stage motors.  This solid-fuel booster would launch the crew module to an altitude high 
and fast enough for the LAS to operate at supersonic speeds and during periods of ascent profile 
maximum dynamic pressure (max Q) and unstable (tumbling) flight modes.  The plan included a 
high-altitude abort simulating failure of the system’s upper stage at the point of stage 
separation.   All abort flight test activities were designed to take place entirely within the 
WSMR.  
 The first developmental flight test of the Ares-I vehicle (designated Ares I-X) was a highly 
successful uncrewed launch from the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in October 2009.  Test flight 
objectives focused on first-stage flight dynamics, controllability, and separation of the first and 
                                                          
4 While the baseline plan for the Ares V was to fly cargo only (the Earth Departure Stage), options were 
retained to human-rate this vehicle if later studies showed launching Orion along with the Earth Departure 
Stage (ala Apollo) was feasible and desirable. 
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upper stages, along with ground operations and first stage recovery.   Ares I-X tested the 
integration and performance of a simulated Ares/Orion “stack” prior to Critical Design Review 
so that resulting design changes could be incorporated before production of flight articles. Ares 
I-X utilized a four-segment solid rocket booster excessed from the Space Shuttle Program, with 
a mass-simulator for the fifth segment.  It included mass/dynamics simulators for the upper 
stage and the Orion.   
 The second uncrewed, developmental flight test of the Ares-I vehicle (designated Ares I-Y) was 
to also be launched from KSC; this flight test was to consist of a five-segment booster with a 
flight-like upper stage and simulated engine.  The Ares I-Y flight was intended to validate the 
operation of the Ares I five-segment first stage, demonstrate the ability to prepare the 
(unpowered) second stage for flight after first stage separation, and demonstrate performance 
of a high-altitude abort of Orion after separation of the first stage.   
 The first orbital flight test of the integrated Orion/Ares-I vehicle was designated Orion-1.  This 
would be an uncrewed first test flight of a complete Ares-I first stage and operational upper 
stage, paired with an operational Orion.  The Orion would be inserted into an orbit that enabled 
rendezvous with the ISS (although there were no plans to dock with the ISS on this first flight) 
to test onboard systems such as the solar panels, reaction control system thrusters and main 
engine, and rendezvous systems.  A water landing and recovery off the coast of California was 
under study for this mission. 
 The first flight of the Orion/Ares-I vehicle to carry astronauts was designated Orion-25.  This 
would be a two-crew mission that would rendezvous and dock with the ISS.  After the Orion-2 
mission, the Orion/Ares vehicle would have achieved IOC and would begin approximately two 
flights per year to the ISS to support crew rotations and to have the Orion spacecraft docked for 
180-day intervals as an emergency crew return vehicle.  At this point, when it was proven that 
the Constellation systems could operationally support the Orion vehicle with routine operations 
to the ISS, the Program had planned full operational capability. Initially, the Program was 
committed to full operational capability with Orion 4 in early 2015. 
This test plan was conceived at the time that the IOC designs were conceptual, and was therefore 
immature.  The flight test plan was expected to mature and evolve with the design, and as 
understanding of risks and uncertainties developed.  Indeed, one of the earliest changes (not 
indicated in Figure 1) was to delete a planned AA-4, a high-altitude abort test that was to be 
performed at WSMR. It was determined that these test objectives could be included with the Ares I-
                                                          
5 The early program contained an unpressurized cargo version of Orion, intended for ISS resupply.  The flight 
test manifest contained an additional uncrewed, unpressurized cargo flight that was to perform automated 
rendezvous and docking with ISS, prior to first flight with a crew.  The unpressurized cargo and automated 
rendezvous and docking requirements were dropped after the first year, primarily due to budget pressures, 
and the associated flight was deleted.  This constitutes the first ‘erosion’ of the number of flights before first 
crewed flight. 
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Y flight.  This had the advantage of avoiding potential range issues at WSMR for such a long down-
range flight, and also afforded the opportunity to add water landing and recovery to the objectives.   
As discussed below, the expected maturation of the test flight plan was complicated by the budget 
challenges to the Program.  Moreover, as the Program matured, the Agency was unable to fully 
clarify either what minimum body of evidence was required for the first flight of humans on a new 
spacecraft or how much testing was enough to provide unforeseen problems sufficient opportunity 
to be revealed 6.  
Early development testing 
The Program also planned and executed early development tests for identified risk areas.  For 
instance, a plan to incrementally build and test the LAS innovative steering motor was 
implemented, and the motor later performed flawlessly in the PA-1 flight test.  Multiple parachute 
tests for both the Orion crew module and the Ares first stage were performed at the Yuma proving 
grounds.   
The second stage of the Ares I was liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen fueled, powered by a modified J-2 
engine designated J-2X.  The modifications were necessary to increase performance of the engine.  
The J-2X engine was also to be used on the upper stage of Ares V for the LC.  Unlike past rocket 
engine developments, far fewer test starts and far less total run times were planned to qualify the 
engine (less than one tenth of the starts and runs used to qualify the Space Shuttle Main Engine, for 
instance).  Given that the J-2X was an engine modification rather than full-scale development, and 
that the design and analysis software currently used didn’t exist for any prior U.S. human space 
flight engine development, engineers and managers felt this test campaign baseline would 
adequately qualify the engine.  The engine development was not immune to test article deletion; 
however, the deletion of spare test articles was assessed to be predominantly a schedule risk in that 
J-2X production assets planned for flight could be diverted to back-fill the test plan if necessary.   
The Program also responded to the inevitable development problems with testing.  High ascent 
acoustic loading and uncertainties surrounding the aero-thermal behavior of the LAS motor 
exhaust plumes and the potential effect on the boost protection cover led to a series of additional 
wind tunnel tests, including hot gas tests, to develop empirical data for refinement of analytical 
models.   
The well-publicized thrust oscillation issuei was addressed with both analysis and testing.  Testing 
investigated the predicted oscillation’s potential impact on the crew’s ability to monitor displays 
and evaluated several possible oscillation reduction design changes.  The Space Shuttle solid 
rockets were instrumented to provide validation for transfer functions.  From these, a design 
solution was selected, along with further options, should further testing reveal more severe 
oscillations than expected.   
                                                          
6 Such requirements do exist for payloads and reflect varying levels of test of new commercial flight vehicles 
based on the level of government insight and importance of the payload.  
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Stability of the Orion crew module after water landing, and safe recovery of the crew in challenging 
sea states was undertaken in a series of water-tank tests that then proceeded to the open ocean. 
A series of Ares I scale model acoustic tests were also undertaken to better understand the expected 
ignition overpressure pulse and liftoff acoustics, and to characterize the effectiveness of several 
sound suppression mitigation strategies, including water deluge, rainbirds, and water bags. 
In these and other cases, the Program directed testing resources to mitigate initially identified and 
emerging development risks.  This can be characterized as an expected allocation of development 
budget and contingency reserves and reflected the efforts by the Program to focus dwindling 
resources on the most critical tasks.  These are only highlights of the developmental test plan; more 
information related to early developmental testing is available. ix 
Budget Challenges Leading to Test Erosion 
Constellation Program’s Lessons Learned, Vol. I: Executive Summaryi begins with the observation: 
“Funding for the Constellation Program was inconsistent and unreliable from its initial formulation 
through its cancellation.”  Indeed, budget cuts were levied in the first fiscal year, and cuts were 
made in all subsequent years.  Initially the Program slipped dates to preserve content (mission 
performance), but the continuingly decreasing annual buying power eventually caused requirement 
scrubs focused on ground and flight tests (rather than performance requirements) and further 
schedule impacts.  Figure 1 illustrates the incremental test erosion that occurred in the test flight 
plan. 
As explained in Constellation Program’s Lessons Learned, Vol. I: Executive Summaryi, these cost and 
schedule problems were not driven by technical challenges that the Constellation Program and its 
government/contractor team faced, but were a direct result of the budget profile and the erosion to 
that budget. 
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Figure 1: Erosion of Constellation's planned integrated flight test plan, 2007 to 2010. 
 
Incremental erosion of the testing scope 
Unfortunately, continuing budget cuts caused delays of procurements, and shifted test dates past 
the point where flight tests could feed data into design, without delay of the targeted IOC date.  
One test that was repeatedly scrutinized for potential deletion was Ares I-Y.  The baseline test flight 
did not have a fully functioning upper stage, which was paced by availability of the upper stage 
engine (the J-2X).  Supporters of the flight test argued that an early ground test version of the J-2X 
engine could be added to the upper stage to expand the Ares I-Y flight test objectives.  This would 
address one of the Program’s top technical risks—the ability to successfully detach and maintain 
guidance control of the upper stage—and also assure that the critical J-2X “start box” conditions 
could be supplied by the upper stage main propulsion system after staging. The conundrum was 
that this addition would potentially delay the test even further, so although test planners from the 
outset promoted the upper stage conditioning objectives, it was never adopted as part of the 
Program baseline.   
Since Ares I-X had no functioning upper stage and utilized a four-segment Space Shuttle solid rocket 
booster, elimination of Ares I-Y would have resulted in only a single flight prior to flying the first 
crew, and elimination of the high-altitude abort test.  This was reported to the Program to be 
unacceptable by the safety and mission assurance community.  Because the budget situation drove 
annual reviews of content, the test flight program was always under review for affordability. Ares I-
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Y was preserved on the manifest during several annual budget-driven attempts to delete it.  
Eventually, Ares I-Y was eliminated in late 2009 because the achievable flight date had slipped with 
respect to the progress of Ares I upper stage development.  After the deletion of the Ares I-Y test 
flight, the Program was not able to achieve consensus on which flight would be the first to fly a 
crew.  The Program designated Orion 2 for planning purposes as the target flight for the first crew 
and initiated studies to determine whether the program would be ready, and planned to designate 
the actual first crewed flight later in the life of the Program after the value of flying the crew was 
better defined and the residual risk was better understood. 
As the Program progressed toward PDR, concern about the erosion of the abort tests and the cuts of 
ground and flight tests was evident in the increasing number of risks and issues discussed about the 
adequacy of the ground and flight test campaign.  The targeted first human flight had also become 
tagged IOC, a significant program developmental and contractual milestone.  These actions fueled 
debates about the adequacy of testing specific systems, as well as a general argument fueled by 
precedent for flying a minimum number of times before flying a crewvii (see alsox,xi).  The NESC 
report was commissioned because these debates could not be concluded.   
At the time Constellation was cancelled, the development ascent test designated Ares I-X and the 
development pad abort test designated PA-1 had been successfully completed, while only a second 
pad abort test and an ascent abort at maximum dynamic pressure remained in the plan.  Several 
recorded open issues related to the deletions were being worked that would have constrained 
certification for crewed flight.   
Results of test erosion 
While the Program was directed to mitigate or “buy down” the risk to the first crewed flight though 
ground and flight test, cuts to ground tests and flight test continued to occur.  Due to the budget 
situation, every test was assessed for deletion as long as the preliminary test objectives could be 
relocated to a remaining test, or if rationale could be developed for elimination of the test.  
At the Program’s PDR, known untenable gaps existed, such as the lack of a first stage separation test 
article. Significant parts of the originally conceived ground and flight test strategy were never put in 
the baseline or were later cut from the Program planning references or deferred until after first 
crewed flight.  These known gaps and critical emerging test requirements were being recorded as 
risks, but many contained mitigation plans that Constellation did not have available funds to 
implement.  There was growing doubt expressed that the existing plans could support placing 
humans on the targeted flight.  The Program’s shrinking resources were unlikely to rectify this7.  
                                                          
7 In the historical context, many senior managers had experienced a similar erosion of testing in the ISS 
program.  Integrated testing was later added back to the program when the political situation improved and 
international partner schedules slipped, which allowed its inclusion.  Many in the Constellation program held 
out hope that testing would ultimately be restored when the Agency was past retirement of the Space Shuttle 
and subsequent funding was freed from this pressure. 
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As a result, the expected increase in understanding the risk was hampered by ever-shrinking test 
data availability.  More problematic was the challenge that most unknown risks would have had 
only a single opportunity to manifest before first crewed flight8.  This concern is further explored 
later in this paper.  Another problematic aspect of the minimized test plan was that much 
integrated ground testing was planned with prototype (or even brass board) hardware prior to 
flight tests, which when coupled with compressed “green light” scheduled sequences that mandated 
successful results on all objectives of all tests to achieve the IOC date may have risked a higher cost 
and schedule impact to complete the work than using higher-fidelity test hardware. 
The Program’s response to the erosion 
Late in 2009, the Program reacted to the slips and erosion with a proposal that would shift the 
flight test plan from late, “validation class” testing of ground-qualified systems to earlier, 
“development class” flight testing of lesser fidelity systems.  Several motives prompted this 
proposed shift: including the desire to recapture objectives that had been lost in the erosion of test 
flights over time, the desire to shift some of the ground test content to flight test for earlier and 
more representative feedback that would more readily influence design than later findings could, 
and the desire to fly earlier for stakeholder support.  
After the president’s budget in Feb. 2010 proposed Program cancellation, the Agency management 
encouraged the Program to continue working on the test plan reformulation to add value to those 
portions of the Constellation architecture that were thought likely to be used in pursuit of the 
President’s proposed “beyond low Earth orbit” objectives.  Although thoroughly studied, the work 
did not reach final, actionable conclusions and was never baselined as part of the Program.  But 
including discussion of this proposal is relevant in that it illustrates the efforts to address the 
lateness and omissions present in the eroded plan.  Moreover, this proposal also rejoined the 
discussion of how much testing was enough before flying the first crew. 
The proposal set forth three flight tests to be flown from KSC, with no further change to the plan to 
fly a second pad abort test and an ascent abort test from WSMR.  The three tests were referred to in 
the study as Flight Tests (FTs)-2, -3, and -4 (indicating the successful Ares I-X as having been FT-1).  
The proposal was based on the premise that in development flight tests, while continuing to design 
for the eventual final configuration, test article configurations do not have to exactly match the 
eventual design intended to be certified, and that each flight could be certified for its own unique 
test flight reference mission based on the specific test objectives and the specific flown 
configuration.  This was expected to be a smaller, “narrower” allowable flight envelope than would 
be permitted for the eventual end design.  These flights were intended to produce data that would 
allow the empirical validation of models and reduction of uncertainties necessary to progressively 
increase, or “open up” the allowed flight envelope for subsequent flights. 
                                                          
8 The Space Shuttle history documents well the phenomena of unknown risks “speaking” through the 
hardware well into operational flight, as documented in “Significant Incidents and Close Calls in Human 
Spaceflight”, March 8, 2010, version of the rapid information page, PAS-2009-003, SAIC [Science Applications 
International Corporation], and the Johnson Space Center Flight Safety Office.  
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 FT-2, would redirect an Ares first stage five-segment test article from a planned horizontal test 
firing to serve as the first stage for the flight test.  The high-altitude abort test objectives were 
allocated to FT-2, and the proposal called for using a production-like Orion crew module with 
those portions of the system executing the abort (such as the LAS and associated avionics) 
would be as flight-like as practical.  FT-2 included a mass and dynamic simulator for the upper 
stage and service module.  FT-2 objectives included first stage flight, flight-like frangible joint 
separation, recovery of the five segment booster, high-altitude abort, entry descent and landing, 
and recovery of the crew module. 
 FT-3 added a functional upper stage with a qualification J-2X engine, and a partially outfitted 
production Orion. The definition of “partially” in this context was still under study.  The FT-3 
first stage objectives were identical to FT-2.  Staging, engine ignition, and delivery to the 
required insertion point were among the primary objectives for the upper stage.  The Orion 
vehicle was to perform orbital insertion and maneuvering, perform system checkouts, and 
perform a nominal entry, descent, landing, and recovery.  
 FT-4 was to be a full production system with non-critical exceptions.  This flight was proposed 
as the first crewed flight, and orbital flight test objectives included rendezvous and docking 
with the ISS. 
The proposal sought to reduce or eliminate some ground testing by replacing the ground tests with 
flight tests.  Though most of the proposal was found feasible, there were unresolved issues.  For 
instance, the proposal called for elimination of the integrated vehicle ground vibration tests 
(IVGVTs).  Constellation had planned to perform IVGVTs in both the first stage (fully fuelled and 
depleted), and the second stage configurations.  In the new proposal, static, modal, and (where 
applicable) proof pressure testing remained for each structural element, along with the random 
vibration testing planned for Orion.  The proposal also called for a “twang” test similar to what had 
been done on Ares I-X and Apollo to characterize the structural response for validation of guidance 
algorithms. The proposed elimination was based on the conceptual plan to address the resultant 
structural load uncertainties by certifying to fly only the flight test profile rather than certifying to 
fly the full envelope, enabling narrowly “placarded”9 early test flights.  This approach would rely on 
flight test results to progressively expand the as-certified operating envelope to required 
parameters.  Although this plan was heavily studied, no agreement was reached.  Primary 
objections were twofold: the structural load forcing functions and vehicle responses could not be 
separated and independently used to validate the models necessary to expand envelopes without 
what was argued to be “sufficient” ground truth data provided by the IVGVT; and that the very low 
energy twang test, while sufficient for guidance algorithm validation was not energetic enough to 
characterize the nonlinear vehicle response to the much higher forcing-function loads expected in 
flight.  
                                                          
9 Placards are used to indicate limitations in an operational envelope (e.g. limits to speeds, pressures, winds, 
sea states, etc.). The can be based on known limitations, or used to indicate thresholds beyond which a system 
has not been tested. Thus narrow “placarding” indicates a narrow window in which the system can safely 
operate. 
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The Program was committed to resolving issues such as the IVGVT before committing a crew to fly 
on FT-4.  Yet the debate regarding how much was enough flight testing was renewed by this plan 
and remained unresolved.  There were those who argued not to fly a crew on the first full 
production vehicle in the design target configuration because it would be the first to have been 
delivered through simple acceptance tests, manufacturing controls, and assembly checkouts.  The 
essentially complete design would not have the chance reveal the unknown-unknowns without a 
flight test of a production vehicle.  
The Unknown Risk—Can You Understand it a priori? 
Of particular concern to the defenders of a more robust test plan was the need to provide 
opportunities for the hardware to reveal problems in the actual operational environment (natural 
and induced).  This was a subject of great debate within the program, and is somewhat addressed 
by the NESC report in discussion of “repeatability”.  Of greatest concern were dynamic events 
(primarily stage separations and engine starts) in the actual flight environment.  While no one 
argued to fly enough tests to have the traditional statistically significant data set, there was no 
agreed-to predetermination of how many uncrewed flight demonstrations would provide sufficient 
confidence to begin crewed flights.  In the absence of such, program decisions eroded the flight test 
manifest with the rationale that the ultimate determination of crewed flight readiness would occur 
later, closer to the date for first crewed flight.  These decisions essentially traded the known risks 
associated with budget reductions for unknown risks down the road.  Such future risks could 
manifest themselves in multiple ways, from schedule and cost hits (adding tests or redesigning 
systems) to actual failure in crewed flights, or not at all.   
Relevant to this discussion is the fact that a recent analysis of the risk progression (or rather, the 
progression of risk understanding) for the Space Shuttle found that the risk of losing the crew was 
underestimated by 2 to 3 orders of magnitudexii.  Instead of the assumed 1:1,000 to 1:10,000, the 
reanalyzed risk to the first crew was 1:9.  This underestimation of residual risk was a combination 
of optimistic engineering judgment of only the known risks with insufficient acknowledgement of 
the unknown. 
Figure 2 illustrates the failure history for uncrewed launch vehicles since 1980, plotted from data in 
Table 1.  Only ascent failures from experienced developers that would have resulted in loss of crew 
or necessitated an ascent abort, had there been a crew aboard the vehicle, were included here.  This 
history, derived from numerous countries with experience in launch vehicle development and 
manufacturing indicates significant learning between the first two flights of a new system and the 
next two.  While the curve doesn’t begin to level out until around flight seven, risk drops 
significantly beginning with third flight.  The data suggests that one test flight does not “buy-down” 
as much risk as three or even two test flights.   
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Figure 2: Historical aggregate failure rate for uncrewed launch vehicles built by experienced developers, post -
1980 (Source data Table 1). 
The Constellation transportation architecture could be expected to follow a similar curve in 
reliability growth once integrated flights commenced.  This formed the basis of the 
recommendation to retain the Ares I-Y test flight, albeit an incomplete flight test vehicle.  Along with 
an uncrewed Orion-1 flight test, Ares I-Y was believed to help move the integrated launch system 
further down the risk curve.  However, no one could predict a priori where (at what level of 
reliability) the Program would begin its growth curve toward that maturity.  Nor could anyone 
predict the shape of such a curve.   
Whatever growth curve Constellation might have tracked (had it pressed toward operational 
capability), it would likely have been driven by whether previously unknown failure scenarios or 
interactions between systems (or between systems and environments) manifested themselves 
during integrated flight tests or operations.  (This is based on a reasonable assumption that any 
known deficiencies would have been assessed and corrected prior to flight.)  The uncovering of 
unknown-unknowns and their correction prior to subsequent flights is what primarily yields 
reliability growth and the growth curve in the early stages of new space launch systems as 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
We assert, based on Figure 2 and the associated data in Table 1, that the unknown-unknowns 
cannot be understood a priori with the current state of risk analyses, and must be discovered 
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through well-planned testing. Moreover, the consideration of residual risk must include the 
potential for unknown-unknowns as related to the number of opportunities the system has been 
afforded to exhibit them. 
Table 1: Historical success and failure record for uncrewed launch vehicles, experienced developers, post-1980. 
Data provided by The Aerospace Corporationvii. Failures only include ascent failures that would have resulted in 
loss of crew or necessitated an ascent abort, had there been a crew aboard the vehicle. (LV Fail=launch vehicle 
failure; TV Fail=transfer vehicle failure ) 
 Launch 1 Launch 2 Launch 3 :Launch 4 Launch 5 
United States 
Delta I Success Success Success Success Success 
Titan 34D Success Success Success Success Success 
Atlas H Success Success Success Success Success 
Atlas G TV Fail Success Success Success Success 
Delta II Success Success Success Success Success 
Titan IV Success Success Success Success Success 
Pegasus Success LV Fail Success Success Success 
Atlas I Success TV Fail Success TV Fail Success* 
Atlas II Success Success Success Success Success 
Taurus  Success Success LV Fail Success Success 
Pegasus XL LV Fail LV Fail Success Success Success 
Athena I LV Fail Success Success Success  
Athena II Success LV Fail Success   
Delta III  LV Fail LV Fail Success   
Minotaur Success Success Success Success Success 
Atlas III Success Success Success Success Success 
Atlas V Success Success Success Success Success 
Delta IV  Success Success Success Success Success 
Taurus XL Success LV Fail    
USSR/Russia 
Proton  Success Success Success Success Success 
Energia  Success Success    
Start-1 Success LV Fail Success Success Success 
Shtil  Success Success    
Rockot KM Success Success Success Success Success 
Dnepr  Success Success Success Success Success 
Soyuz  Success Success Success Success Success 
Soyuz 2 Success Success Success Success Success 
VOLNA R29R LV Fail     
China 
CZ-2C Pre-1980 Pre-1980 Pre-1980 Success Success 
CZ-3 LV Fail Success Success Success Success 
CZ-4 Success Success    
CZ-2E Success Success LV Fail Success LV Fail 
CZ-2D Success Success Success Success Success 
CZ-3A Success Success Success Success Success 
CZ-3B LV Fail Success Success Success Success 
CZ-1D Success     
CZ-2C/SD Success Success Success Success Success 
CZ-4B Success Success Success Success Success 
CZ-2F Success Success Success Success Success 
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 Launch 1 Launch 2 Launch 3 :Launch 4 Launch 5 
KT-1 LV Fail LV Fail    
CZ-4C Success Success Success   
ESA 
Ariane 1 Pre-1980 LV Fail Success Success LV Fail 
Ariane 3 Success Success Success Success LV Fail 
Ariane 2 LV Fail Success Success Success Success 
Ariane 4 Success Success Success Success Success 
Ariane 5 LV Fail LV Fail Success Success Success 
India 
SLV-3 Pre-1980 Success LV Fail Success  
ASLV LV Fail LV Fail Success Success  
PSLV A LV Fail Success Success Success Success 
GSLV LV Fail Success Success LV Fail Success 
Japan 
Mu-3 Success Success Success Success Success 
N-1 Success Success    
N-2 Success Success Success Success  
H-I Success Success Success Success Success 
H-II Success Success Success Success Success 
J-I Success     
M-5 Success Success LV Fail Success Success 
H-IIA Success Success Success Success Success 
Ukraine 
Zenit-2 LV Fail LV Fail Success LV Fail Success 
Zenit-3SL Success Success LV Fail Success Success 
*Conditional success: payload failed to achieve orbit. 
Conclusions 
A sufficient T&E plan not only queries the hardware and software to confirm that the foreseeable 
problems that can be identified by requirement verification, design validation, and risk mitigation 
planning activities have been avoided or eliminated, it also interrogates the hardware and software 
for the unknown-unknown risks that even the best planning will not identify.  In other words, the 
T&E plan must afford opportunities for the system to reveal unforeseen problems.  Testing nominal 
and contingency operational scenarios in representative environments using sufficiently flight-like 
configurations (test like you fly), is one among several mitigations that provide the appropriate 
opportunities. 
The challenge that remains for future programs is how to balance the quantifiable cost savings 
achieved by trimming the T&E strategy with the unquantifiable accrual of the intangible risks of 
things you won’t know because the system was not given sufficient opportunity to reveal an 
underlying problem. We assert that NASA’s current human-rating requirements do not adequately 
address the unexpected things the hardware can reveal to the designer during test, nor does it 
provide sufficient rationale to sustain a human-rating certification test plan in the face of budget 
challenges.  
T&E objectives associated with safety and survival must be identified and protected in the plan in 
its earliest conceptual form rather than waiting to identify and then protect them in the completed 
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strategic-level plan delivered at PDR.  A cogent, integrated T&E plan cannot withstand budget 
challenges if the underlying requirements and rationale (certification criterion, residual risk) are 
left open to broad interpretation. 
NASA must continue to explore this topic more deeply.  This must include Constellation’s attempt to 
understand historic failure trends in addition to individual historic failure causes.  The tendency is 
to only address known design risks in test plan formulation and to focus only on verification to a 
specification.  Query of hardware for unknown-unknown risks must be a part of the certification 
criteria.   
The Agency should interpret its current certification requirements to a level such that a program’s 
plan for design, analysis, and test can be clearly seen to either meet or not meet those requirements, 
particularly in the face of budget pressures. Not doing so raises the real risk that unforeseeable 
problems will not be discovered, and test data needed to understand residual risk will not be 
collected for decision makers charged with certifying a new system for human flight. 
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